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I. Introduction
There is, when discussing the now fashionable topic of
extraordinary rendition, a certain conceptual confusion: when we
consider semantic arguments, even the verb rendere, in Latin,
would normally signify to "give something back," normally to
someone who has the right to ask for such restitution. The term
rendition, as a derivation of the Latin term rendere thus means to
"hand back," a meaning which is often lost in the current debate
about rendition.
Rendition, in legal terms, implies the transfer of a person from
t Ingrid Detter de Lupis Frankopan, D.Phil., Oxon; J.D., Stockholm; Lic. en Droit, Paris;
Dipl. European Law, Turin; Emeritus Lindhagen Professor of International Law,
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one jurisdiction to another. In the case of what is usually called
"ordinary rendition," the procedure has kept its original meaning
of handing over (or back) a person to another jurisdiction with
better rights to instigate a trial.'
II. Ordinary Rendition
Ordinary rendition in the United States has its historical roots
in the need to recapture fugitive slaves.2 Nowadays rendition
often takes place between the various States of the United States
when trial is more appropriate in another State.3 Rendition
procedure is authorized by article 4(2) of the U.S. Constitution.4
Such rendition is internal to the United States in character and
clearly does not involve any other countries.' Such ordinary
rendition continues to be used in intra-U.S. situations.
I BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298-99 (7th ed. 1999).
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."), repealed by
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
3 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2000). This procedure is
also called interstate rendition. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298-99 (7th ed. 1999).
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
5 On federal interests in interstate renditions, see Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483
U.S. 219, 221 (1987) (holding that Puerto Rico had authority under the Extradition Act
to invoke power of federal courts by mandamus action to demand extradition of fugitive
from asylum state); Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 134-135 (1916) (stating that a state is
free to surrender a fugitive to the state from which he has fled); Roberts v. Reilly, 116
U.S. 80, 94 (1885) (holding that extradition procedure is governed by U.S.
Congressional legislation and that individual states do not have the discretion to deviate
from its uniformity); cf Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872) (holding
that the Constitutional provision requiring the surrender of a person charged in any state
with treason, felony, or other crimes is obligatory upon every state and a part of the law
of every state); Com. of Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 83-84 (1861)
(holding that it is the duty of the state, upon proper demand by another state, to surrender
a fugitive); Prigg v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616, 618-619 (1842)
(holding that, because the extradition of fugitive slaves is exclusively regulated by U.S.
Congressional legislation permitting slave owners to retrieve their slaves from where
they have fled, a state may not punish such an act of retrieval as unlawful). In 1934, it
was made unlawful for "any person to flee from one State to another for the purpose of
avoiding prosecution ... in certain cases." Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-233, 48
Stat. 782 (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2000)).
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III. Deportation, Extradition and Extraordinary Rendition
Deportation and extradition are forms of rendition, although
rarely referred to as such, and involve the sending of a person to
be tried or otherwise dealt with by another jurisdiction.6
Deportation implies the expulsion of an alien whose presence in
the territory of a State is deemed undesirable.' Deportation often
takes place after an alien has served a prison sentence or otherwise
been convicted by a court in one country;8 the court issues a
judgment or a decision that the convicted person shall, possibly
after having served a prison sentence, be sent out of the country,
normally to his original home State.9
There are safeguards in international law that a person lawfully
residing in a country will not be deported without the judgment of
a court or another State authority.10 Extradition, on the other hand,
6 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 450, 605 (7th ed. 1999). In fact, the definitions of
"extradition" and "rendition" each reference the other as an analogous term. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 605, 1298-99 (7th ed. 1999).
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (7th ed. 1999).
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1996) (listing the circumstances upon which an alien shall
be deported).
9 "If an alien defendant is subject to deportation, the court may provide, as a
condition of supervised release, that he be deported and remain outside the United States,
and may order that he be delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for such
deportation." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(d) (2006).
I0 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1984, Eur. T.S. No. 117. Article 1, titled
"Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens," provides that:
1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom
except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed:
a. to submit reasons against his expulsion, b. to have his case reviewed, and c. to be
represented for these purposes before the competent authority or a person or persons
designated by that authority. 2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his
rights under paragraph 1La, b and c of this Article, when such expulsion is necessary in
the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security.
Id. Furthermore, Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be
expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and
shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed
to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be
represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons
especially designated by the competent authority.
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is performed under international agreements," transferring
normally a person of a specific nationality to his home country or,
alternatively, transferring a person to a place where he is alleged to
have committed a crime.12
Straightforward extradition implies the handing over of a
person to another State, normally in order for that other State to try
the person in its own courts. Extradition is usually carried out
under specific treaties and numerous countries have ratified such
agreements to facilitate trial in another country of persons indicted
in criminal proceedings. Such procedure is sometimes called for if
a person is a citizen of another State and that State claims to be
better suited to try the person. There is rarely a case for claiming
that extradition would violate a person's human rights.13 In other
cases, a person may be extradited to a State whose interests he is
said to have violated or whose citizens have had their rights
infringed. In other cases, again, a person is extradited to another
State as he is alleged to have committed a crime in that other State
which would, in a trial, apply the lex loci delicti, that is to say the
law in the State where the crime took place.14
Under extradition treaties there is usually a clause that exempts
"political" crimes from the list for which extradition may take
place. 5 Nor is a person normally extradited to a country where he
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 13, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
11 See, e.g., Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-23 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K.
Extradition Treaty].
12 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 605 (7th ed. 1999).
13 Ocalan v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 45 (2005).
14 The lex loci delicti is the law of the place where the crime took place. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 923 (7th ed. 1999).
15 "The first provision to protect political offenders appeared in a Belgian
extradition act in 1833 and has since been incorporated into most Western extradition
treaties." Antje C. Petersen, Extradition and the Political Offense Exception in the
Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767, 774 (1992); see also id. & n.23 (citing an
extradition treaty with such a clause between the U.S. and Germany). The extradition
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom also contains a clause
pertaining to political offenses. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 11, art. 4. For
a detailed analysis of extradition, see generally IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, EXTRADITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
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may be subjected to harsh interrogation or torture, or to a country
which applies the death penalty if the sending State would not
impose such sanctions for the suspected crime. 6 On the other
hand, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
of 1977,17 was adopted to avoid that specific acts, like acts of
terrorists, would be classified as "political" and lead to denial of
extradition. There is now a dilemma: a suspected terrorist may not
be exempt from extradition as his acts are not, under the said
Convention, to be considered as "political"; but, on the other hand,
he must not be extradited to a country which might subject him to
torture or harsh treatment, even if there are diplomatic assurances
to the contrary.1 8 At times, however, it may be that diplomatic
pledges are effective and prevent the real risk of torture and an
extraditing State is enabled to proceed with the extradition.'9
Many problems concerning deportation and extradition, in
particular in so far as possible torture may ensue in the destination
country, also arise in the field of extraordinary rendition.
Extraordinary rendition, however, involves different methods and
practices than either deportation or extradition.
IV. Essential Features of Extraordinary Rendition
In the discussions on extraordinary rendition there are a host of
misunderstandings and conflicting definitions. It may be possible
to reach at least provisional common ground by a stringent
analysis of what specific terms actually mean. Extraordinary
rendition is quite different from ordinary rendition and extradition
16 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1989);
Chahal v. United Kingdom (No. 22), 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1855 para. 80; Nivette
v. France, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 493, 501 (emphasizing that extradition to a State
imposing the death sentence violates Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
17 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ.
T.S. No. 90.
18 Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, Comm. No. 233/2003, U.N.
GAOR Comm. Against Torture., 34th Sess., para. 13.4, U.N. Doe.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 20, 2005) (stating that the fact that diplomatic assurances
had been issued was not sufficient where the extraditing country, Sweden, should have
known that Egypt resorts to widespread torture of prisoners).
19 See Mamatkulov and Askerov v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 494, 495-97 (2005);
see also Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 35 para. 75 (1991); Vilvarajah &
Others v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 248, 288 para. 107 (1991).
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described above.
Extraordinary rendition signifies the handing over of a person
to be questioned in another jurisdiction. The significance of
extraordinary rendition changed substantially when the practice
was introduced by the United States in the 1980s to transfer
foreign delinquents to be tried or, more often, interrogated in other
countries outside such extradition treaties,2" and such countries
were chosen where one might suspect that a different level of
treatment of detainees was afforded than what might be expected
in the Western world.21
The difference to ordinary rendition and to deportation or
extradition is essentially that, in the case of extraordinary
rendition, there is no link between the person "rendered" and the
country to which he is sent. In the case of extraordinary rendition,
a person is transferred to a country where he is not (normally) a
citizen. Nor is that country the scene of any alleged crimes
committed by the person in question.
Extraordinary rendition or irregular rendition is thus a term
used to describe the transfer of a person from one State to another
State, normally for the purposes of being subjected to some form
of interrogation. During the last few years this practice has been
criticized as some States to which such rendition has been
effectuated are countries with a questionable human rights
record.22 It has, at times, appeared that such States might use
harsh interrogation techniques or torture to extract information
20 For an explanation of rendition taking place outside the framework of extradition
treaties and its implications on human rights, see Edmund S. McAllister, The Hydraulic
Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-Machain and the Case for a Justifiable
Abduction, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 449, 474-76 (2004); Jimmy Gurule, Terrorism,
Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals
Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 457, 490-93 (1994).
21 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary
Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309, 320 (2006) (stating
that Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan are nations known to take part
in extraordinary rendition and are identified by the U.S. State Department as countries
that practice torture).
22 See A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process For Irregular Rendition, 37
SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 62 (2006) (identifying Uzbekistan, Egypt and Syria as nations
being used for extraordinary rendition even though these nations have questionable
human rights records).
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from the person whom has been rendered.23
On the other hand, during the more or less emotional debates
on extraordinary rendition, commentators have often deviated to
discuss prison conditions and treatment in general of suspected
terrorists.24 The subject of extraordinary rendition is sufficiently
vast for laudable attempts to keep an analysis of the subject to
narrow latitudes, corresponding to the definition set out above.
According to a Report of the Parliament of European Union
(often cited but usually attributed to the Parliament of the Council
of Europe, a totally different organization), extraordinary rendition
could be defined as "an extra-judicial practice which contravenes
established international human rights standards and whereby an
individual suspected of involvement in terrorism is illegally
abducted, arrested and/or transferred into the custody of US
officials and/or transported to another country for interrogation
which, in the majority of cases, involves incommunicado detention
and torture., 25  This is not an acceptable definition. Numerous
conditions of this attempted definition are uncertain or vague:
should "illegal" be understood to mean illegal under the law of the
sending and/or receiving State or under international law? Is the
prohibition of being held "incommunicado" on the same level as
the prohibition of torture? Does the caveat of "in majority of
cases" mean that there can be legal and acceptable forms of
extraordinary rendition?
It is essential to underline that extraordinary rendition is not
per se illegal. It is only if torture ensues that such rendition
violates legal rules. There is, in effect, an acceptable practice
whereby States resort to extraordinary rendition under various
Mutual Assistance Treaties to send an arrested person to be
interrogated in another country.26  This can be done outside
23 See id. at 3 (citing Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but
Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al).
24 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares
from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200, 1211-15 (2007); Sadat, supra
note 21, at 313.
25 Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, para. 36, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-
0020/2007 (2007).
26 See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-
Turk., June 7, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 3111; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
2008]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
extradition treaties in cases where it is more appropriate to
interrogate a person elsewhere, for example under Interpol or
Europol mechanisms or in procedures involving the European
Arrest Warrant.27 Such procedures resemble in every detail
extraordinary rendition as the term is usually understood without
any indication of harsh treatment or torture.
Extraordinary rendition may not be a good term for practices
where torture is actual or presumed: it would be more appropriate
to speak of "outsourcing" of practices which a State would rather
not perform itself. "Torture by proxy" could also be used to
describe transfers of suspected terrorists to countries for harsh
interrogation techniques or torture.
There is also a serious problem of proof of actual torture and it
is clearly essential to establish to what extent reports are correct
that suspected terrorists have been flown from the United States or
from elsewhere and have subsequently been subjected to torture in
a third State. It is important to clarify to what extent evidence that
torture has been inflicted is reliable and, furthermore, to establish
what actually constitutes torture.
Lawyers have not devoted much attention to the practices of
extraordinary rendition." There are some factual, but often
sensationalist, accounts29 written by journalists, politicians, human
right movements and pressure groups on this practice. When one
May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019. For a list of Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties to which the U.S. is a party, see U.S. Dept. of State, Mutual Legal Assistance
(MLAT) and Other Agreements, http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/
judicial_690.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
27 See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1, 1-2
(explaining the replacement of extradition procedures between E.U. Member States with
the European arrest warrant). The European arrest warrant is designed to replace formal
extradition by requiring each national judicial authority to "ipsofacto recognize requests
for the surrender of a person made by the judicial authority of another Member State
with a minimum of formalities." Commission Proposal for a Council Framework
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between the
Member States, at 2, COM (2001) 522 final (Sept. 25, 2001).
28 For examples of analysis by lawyers of extraordinary rendition, see Sadat, supra
note 24; Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and
the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007).
29 See, e.g., STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE
PROGRAM (St. Martin's Press 2006); TREVOR PAGLEN & A. C. THOMPSON, TORTURE
TAXI: ON THE TRAIL OF THE CIA'S RENDITION FLIGHTS (Melville House Publishing
2006).
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examines the material on this topic, however, much consists of
newspaper articles and more or less tendentious articles. Even
international organizations, like the UN Human Rights
Commission, the European Union and the Council of Europe,
mostly cite newspaper reports when they make their own
assessment as to what extraordinary rendition involves.3"
Much is also written on this subject, in the United States and
elsewhere, to criticize the present Republican administration in the
United States for its policies in Iraq and for ensuing policies on the
"War on Terror."31  Before one continues to analyze the legal
position with regard to extraordinary rendition, it may be useful to
underline that it was indeed a Democratic administration that
initially allowed such questionable methods of interrogation of
detainees. The CIA was granted permission to use rendition in a
presidential directive signed by President Bill Clinton in 1995.32
Nor is there any sign that the Democrats, if they come into power
after the next election, would cease the practice of extraordinary
rendition.
It is, however, correct that the practice of extraordinary
rendition has grown sharply under the Bush administration since
the 9/11 attacks.33 There has been an enhanced need to deal with
suspected terrorists by forceful interrogation tactics, clearly to
preempt further attacks on the civilian population. It is important
to establish where the limit goes for the permissible techniques of
interrogation as balanced against the interest to safeguard citizens
of the State. It is now alleged that some detainees are sent to
receiving States such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and
Uzbekistan34 where, reportedly, some interrogation practices are
30 See, e.g., Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, supra note 25, paras. 17, 148-149.
31 See, e.g., Satterthwaite, supra note 28, at 1333-34; Sadat, supra note 24, at 1200-
06.
32 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39 (June
21, 1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
33 See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2007); Craig Whitlock, Europeans
Investigate CIA Role in Abductions, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al.
34 Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial Detention and Treatment of Detainees:
Restoring Our Moral Credibility and Strengthening Our Moral Standing: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations 10, 36 (2007) (statements of Tom
Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch, and Dr. Daniel
2008]
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used which might violate basic human rights.35
It is, on the other hand, quite obscure as to what the quid pro
quo might be when a State sends a person to be interrogated in
another State. What does the receiving State get in return for its
interrogating services? This is a question rarely raised and not
ever clearly addressed.
V. Extraordinary Rendition and Refoulement
Refoulement means the expulsion of persons who have the
right to be recognized as refugees. The principle of non-
rdfoulement was first codified in 1954 in the UN Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees which, in Article 33(1), provides
that: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("r6fouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion. ' 3 6 The principle of non-rdfoulement does not
only forbid the expulsion of refugees to their country of origin but
to any other country where they might risk being persecuted. Only
if the person to be expelled constitutes a danger to national
security may transfer be possible under the UN Convention.37
Problems still arise due to the fact that some States have not
ratified the Refugee Convention. Some States might even lack
formal procedures for determining refugee status.38 It is suggested
Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University); Extraordinary Rendition in U.S.
Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations: Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the
Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 10th Cong. 4 (2007)
(statement of Amnesty International USA).
35 Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, supra note 34, at 4.
36 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), adopted July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
37 Id. art. 33(2). For a discussion of rdfoulement in general, see Sir Elihu
Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle Non-
R~foulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION 1N INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNCHR's
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 87, 87-179 (Erika Feller,
Volker Turk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
38 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, 15 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 567, 593-94 (2003) (naming Jordan, Syria, Pakistan, Indonesia, and
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that the same principle applies to extraordinary rendition, that a
person must thus not be rendered to a country where his life or
freedom would be threatened or to a country where he can be
expected to be tortured.39 Any State through which transit takes
place would appear to assume an obligation to prevent, and
preempt, that this occurs.4 °
VI. Relevance of Legal Prohibitions of Torture
For some time there have been efforts to forbid or condemn
torture by express provisions in international law. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1949, in Article 5, states that
"[n]o one may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."'" The Declaration adopted
by the General Assembly on 9 December 197542 also concerns the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
These Declarations have predominantly only declaratory force,
but it could also be argued that they re-state a rule that already
exists in international law.43 This pre-existing rule that the
Declarations confirm is probably an expression of a form of
minimum standards4 4 rather than any customary rule; any
argument on "custom," "usage" or "practice" relies on the absurd
notion of "negative custom. 45
Thailand as having no domestic refugee law as well as not being parties to the Refugee
Convention).
39 See COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. SCHOOL OF LAW, TORTURE
BY PROXY: NATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITIONS" 31-83 (2004), available at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf,
David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights
Analysis, 19 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 139-41 (2006).
40 See Council Directive 2003/1 1O/EC, art. 8, 2003 O.J. (L 321) 26, 26, 29.
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 73, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
42 G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
43 INGRID DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 294 (1994).
44 For further discussion on the concept of minimum standards, see infra Part IX.
45 Ingrid Detter, The Law of War and Illegal Combatants, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1049, 1054 (2007). It is not logical to claim that a State, or combatants in the field, air,
or sea, having refrained from certain cruel practices would, on account of this passivity,
be bound in the future not to commit such acts. Id. In other words, it is not by the force
2008]
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The prohibition against torture is more emphatically confirmed
in straightforward treaty stipulations, on a regional scale in Europe
by the European Convention on Human Rights46 and by the
specific European Torture Convention of 1987"7 and in North and
South America by the American Convention on Human Rights of
196948 and by the Inter-American Convention of Torture of 1985." 9
There is also a much neglected African Charter on Human and
People's Rights of 1981.50
On the universal and global scene, torture is forbidden by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 51 and, above
all, by the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT)
of 1984, a treaty entirely dedicated to the prohibition of torture. 52
It is to be noted that the United States has incorporated
provisions prohibiting torture in internal law in the U.S. War
Crimes Act (WCA), as amended by the Military Commissions Act
of "negative custom" that a prohibition becomes effective but because of an imperative
diktat of conscience and of normal human attitudes, as reflected in a minimum standards
of civilized behavior. Id. at 1054, 1086-87.
46 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
47 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126, 27 1.L.M. 1152 (1988)
(securing the prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment found in
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights by authorizing visits to sites
where persons are being denied their liberty by a governmental authority).
48 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5,
opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
49 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519
(1986).
50 Organization of African Unity, African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights art. 5, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
51 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 7.
52 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. On 18 December 2002, an Optional Protocol
to the Torture Convention was adopted with the intent to establish a preventive system of
regular visits to places of detention by a special Subcommittee and by independent
international and national bodies. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 57/199,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/199 (Dec. 18, 2002).
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of 2006 (MCA).53 The Torture Convention Implementation Act of
1994 also incorporate international prohibitions into domestic law
of the United States54 and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 also
prohibits torturous, or as it is often called "enhanced" interrogation
practices.5
Less attention has been devoted by commentators to the fact
that "inhuman treatment" is also prohibited by the Torture
Convention 6 and under other international instruments. 7  The
difference between inhuman treatment and torture is that inhuman
treatment need not be "intended" to cause suffering. 8 But
latitudes may change: the European Court of Human Rights held
in the Ireland case that the so called "five techniques" amounted
to inhuman treatment but not to torture. 59 The five techniques are:
wall-standing; hooding; subjection to noise; deprivation of sleep;
and deprivation of food and drink.60  A later case, however,
clarified that the same practices today might well be considered to
amount, not only to inhuman treatment, but to torture as the high
standard demanded today in the field of human rights demands
more "firmness.'
On the other hand it is important to note that, for example,
deprivation of sleep, which by commentators is often regarded as
outright torture, may not unquestionably be classified as torture
when seeking to extract information from a suspected terrorist if
such information might save the lives of other innocent citizens.
The United States admits that it has schemes allowing for
extraordinary rendition, but the United States Administration has
53 War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007);
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632-35
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441).
54 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000).
55 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000dd-2000ddl (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
56 Convention Against Torture, supra note 52, art. 1.
57 Council of Europe, supra note 46, art. 3.
58 Convention Against Torture, supra note 52, arts. 1, 16. The same absence of
subjective criterion is applied to degrading treatment. See Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 15 (1978).
59 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 67 (1978).
60 Id. at41.
61 Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 151, 183.
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formally denied that such practices entail torture. On July 20,
2007 President Bush clarified in an Executive Order the treatment
that must afforded to detainees and repeated that the United States
does not condone torture of captives by intelligence officials.62
The President insisted that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions would apply: this article provides some minimum
guarantees to soldiers and shipwrecked as well as to the civilian
population.63
The President was possibly wrongly advised by referring to the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as
this article is not applicable in situations of suspected terrorists.64
The article only protects "real" combatants and "real" civilians
and not those who do not wear a uniform but clandestinely take up
arms to commit terrorist acts.65 Instead, the Order could have
referred to international minimum human rights standards.66
As has been suggested above and which will be shown later in
this text, the very question of legality or illegality turns on actual
proof and reliable evidence as to whether extraordinary rendition
as practiced nowadays by the United States and several other
consenting States actually involves an accepted definition of
prohibited torture.
Some claim that extraordinary rendition violates Article 3(2)
62 Exec. Order No. 13440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007).
63 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, openedfor
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287. Common Article 3 provides some minimum guarantees to soldiers and
shipwrecked as well as to the civilian population. Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra note
45, at 1057. Article 3 of the above Geneva Conventions is referred to as "Common
Article 3" because it appears in the same form in all four Conventions. Id. at 1079
n.191.
64 See Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra note 45, passim (discussing reasons why
Common Article 3 may not apply to terrorists).
65 Id. at 1058-60.
66 Id. at 1086-92.
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of the Torture Convention which the United States has ratified.67
The article provides that:
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such
grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all
relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.68
The prohibition derives its phrasing from the prohibition of
r~foulement in refugee law,69 in the rules concerning extradition,
and other rules in the field of conflict of laws.7 °
But Article 3(2) of the Torture Convention does not really
cover extraordinary rendition involving torture: the United States
is not "expelling" or "returning" persons under this scheme.71
Suspected terrorists are dispatched for interrogation elsewhere
and, furthermore, at no stage does the United States relinquish
control of the fate of the detainees sent for such questioning.72
Even if the Torture Convention were applicable, the question
arises as to whether a State might be relieved from certain
obligations in the case of national emergency. This question thus
concerns the right of derogation. A most important question
concerns whether a situation of national emergency dispenses with
obligations assumed under the Torture Convention and under other
international engagements. It is to be noted that the Convention
67 Satterthwaite, supra note 28, at 1367-69; see also David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585,
599 (2006).
68 Convention Against Torture, supra note 52, art. 3.
69 Refugee Convention, supra note 36, art. 33.
70 For a treaty-specific overview of conflict of laws principles in the field of
extradition, see Yaffa Zilbershats, Extraditing Israeli Citizens to the United States-
Extradition and Citizenship Dilemmas, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 297, 301-10 (2000).
71 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 52, art. 3.
72 See Beth Henderson, From Justice to Torture: The Dramatic Evolution of U.S.-
Sponsored Renditions, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 189, 197 (2006) ("U.S. participation
in a rendition will not serve to insulate the rendered individual from trial in the United
States.").
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for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention on Human Rights") allows a contracting
State to derogate from certain obligations "[i]n time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation" to the
extent that this is strictly required "by the emergencies of the
situation" and on the condition that such derogations "are not
inconsistent with other obligations under international law." 3 A
State bound by the Convention may thus derogate from the
obligation under Article 5 of not depriving a person of his liberty
and under Article 6 to give a fair trial within a certain time
period.74 However, derogations from Article 3, which deals with
the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, are not
permitted.15
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also
provides for the possibility of derogations in time of national
emergencies.76 The Torture Convention, however, excludes all
such possibility of derogation, even in the case of serious national
emergency.77
There is no doubt that the United States did find itself in a
situation of national emergency after 9/11 but, as shown above,
relevant conventions do not allow for derogation even in such
situations. On the other hand, national courts have not found any
73 Council of Europe, supra note 46, art. 15.
74 Id. arts. 5, 6.
75 Id. art. 3.
76 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4(1); cf U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-
Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, Comm'n on Human
Rights, Note Verbale Dated 24 August 1984from the Permanent Representative of the
Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the Secretary-General,
Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) (setting forth the Siracusa Principles
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights). A State may derogate from its article 4 obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "only when faced with a situation of
exceptional and actual or imminent danger which threatens the life of the nation." Id.
para. 39. A "threat to the life of the nation" is defined as a threat that:
(a) Affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of the territory of the
State, and (b) Threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political
independence of the territorial integrity of the State or the existence or basic functioning
of institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the rights recognized in the Covenant.
Id.
77 Convention Against Torture, supra note 52, art. 2.
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need for relaxation of stringent rules forbidding enhanced
interrogation methods.78
It is futile to rely on the Torture Convention or other formal
treaties to prove the illegality of extraordinary renditions involving
torture. Numerous States have not ratified these agreements and it
is essentially to these non-party States to which suspected
terrorists have been sent under the extraordinary rendition
schemes.79
There may, however, be other rules of international law more
on point than the Torture Convention and other formal treaties to
78 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Feb. 15, 2006, docket number I BvR 357/05, at juris online/Rechtsprechung, available
at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_lbvrO35705.html (declaring the
Aviation Security Act, which authorized the shooting down of aircraft controlled by
those seeking to use it as a weapon, void as an impermissible derogation from the Basic
Law); HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank [2002] IsrSC
57(2) 349, paras. 26-34, available at http://elyonI.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/search-eng/
verdict bymisc.html (search "Search by Case no." for "case no. 3239" and "year 2002,"
then follow "PDF" hyperlink) (discussing how judicial intervention for detainees is a
necessary right that should not be delayed); HCJ 3278/02 Ctr. for the Def. of the
Individual v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank [2003] lsrSC 57(1) 385, para.
24, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/searcheng/verdict-bymisc.html
(search "Search by Case no." for "case no. 3278" and "year 2002," then follow "PDF"
hyperlink) ("Even [prisoners] suspected of terrorist activity of the worst kind are entitled
to conditions of detention which satisfy minimal standards of humane treatment and
ensure basic human necessities."); HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v.
Israel et al. [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 1, para. 40, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_
eng/94/000/051/aO9/94051000.aO9.pdf (holding that the General Security Service does
not have the authority to use the "necessity defense" as a tool for utilizing inhumane
interrogation tactics); A (FC) & Others (FC) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005]
UKHL 71, paras. 33, 45, 52, 53, [2006] 2 A.C. 221, 261, 268, 270-72 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (discussing the potentially broadening scope of what constitutes torture and the
admissibility of evidence procured by torture). For a Press Release explaining the
German case regarding the Aviation Security Act cited above, see Press Release No.
11/2006, Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], Authorization to
Shoot Down Aircraft in the Aviation Security Act Void (Feb. 15, 2006),
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg06-0 11 en.html.
79 For a list of countries to which suspected terrorists have been rendered, see
sources cited supra notes 21-22; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text. For an
updated list of countries who have ratified (or failed to ratify) the Torture Convention,
see United Nations, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
9. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, New York, 10 December 1984,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/9.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
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clarify the prohibition of extraordinary rendition involving torture.
For example, the question as to whether extraordinary rendition
would have been compatible with international law before the
adoption of the Torture Convention in 1984 is usually avoided in
subsequent discussions. Yet, extraordinary rendition cases
involving torture have been reported before this date but, still, the
question of ancillary prohibitive rules is rarely, if ever, raised in
discussions on extraordinary rendition.8 ° Yet, it is fairly certain
that practices involving subjecting detainees to torture were
prohibited even before 1984, as perhaps most strikingly shown by
evidence given in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.81
VII.Torture Flights, Ghost Detainees and Black Sites
A whole new language has evolved around the relatively new
practice of extraordinary rendition. Many now speak of "torture
flights" to signify the chartered planes that have taken some
detainees to be interrogated in specific countries known to practice
harsh interrogation methods and torture. Most of these countries
have not ratified the Torture Convention.
A number of airlines, for example, Jeppesen, a subsidiary of
Boeing and Tepper Airlines, are said to be involved in such torture
flights.82 It is clear that actual precise evidence is not available:
most consist of reports in newspapers which may or may not be
reliable.83 It is, however, highly likely that a least some of these
80 For further discussion on fundamental or intrinsic human rights, see DETTER,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 43, at 288-305; INGRID DETTER, CONCEPT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46-51, 119 (2d ed. 1995).
81 See 20 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, THE TOKYO
WAR CRIMES TRIAL 49,663-49,761 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds.,
1981); United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), in XII TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10, at 35-38 (1949); XII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER
1946, at 257 (1947).
82 See Complaint, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. C 07-2798 (N.D. Cal.
May 30, 2007) (asserting that Jeppensen aided the CIA in its extraordinary rendition
practices). See also Bob Egelko, Judge Dismisses Renditions Lawsuit in San Jose, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Feb. 13, 2008, at B2(reporting that Judge Ware in a San
Francisco Court blocked the hearing of a case brought by the American Civil Liberties
Union against Jeppesen Data Plan, alleging that the airway company ran "torture
flights." The Judge held that such matters were a "state secret.").
83 See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, European Inquiry Says C.I.A. Flew 1,000 Flights in
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flights have taken place, and that detainees have been taken from
one jurisdiction to another, usually to one of these countries where
torture is likely to be used. 4
The CIA is also said to hold certain "ghost detainees," that is
to say detention of prisoners who are not officially registered.
Such "ghost detainees" are kept outside of judicial oversight,
sometimes without ever entering US territory.85
Some detainees are, according to reports, taken through secret
detention centres: so called "black sites" are normally used by the
CIA in cooperation with other governments. 6  States that
cooperate in such schemes may have their international
responsibility engaged under various international agreements if
such detention precludes the defence rights of a detainee,87
especially if detention is prolonged in time.88
It is this cooperation by other states that has provoked a series
of investigations and reports in various international organizations.
Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at A12; Nat Hentoff, Have a Nice Flight, The Village
Voice, Feb. 7, 2007, at 14; Daniel McGrory, U.S. Torture 'were Refuelled in Britain,
TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 16, 2005, at 16; Marie Woolf, Torture Flights Landed in U.K., Admit
Air Controllers, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Feb. 19, 2006, at 23.
84 AMNESTY INT'L, U.S.A: BELOW THE RADAR: SECRET FLIGHTS TO TORTURE AND
'DISAPPEARANCE' 24-32 (2006) [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l Report].
85 See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, RENDITION, 2007, Cm. 7171.
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., Kurt v. Turkey (No. 74), 1998-1I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1185, para. 124,
where the European Court of Human Rights stated that "arbitrary deprivation of...
liberty" and "the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation" of
the rights guaranteed by Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
88 See, e.g., Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-1V Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (imposition of death
penalty following an unfair trial and prolonged detention violated Articles 3, 5, and 6 of
European Convention); Sudrez-Rosero Case, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 35,
paras. 90-91 (Nov. 12, 1997) (prolonged detention and poor treatment of detainee
violated Article 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights); Veldsquez
Rodriguez Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 187 (July 29, 1988)
(prolonged detention and poor treatment of detainee violated Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of
the American Convention on Human Rights); Polay Campos v. Peru, Comm. No.
577/1994, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 61st Sess., paras. 8.4, 8.6-.7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (Jan. 9, 1998) (prolonged detention and poor treatment of
detainee violated Articles 7 and 10(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).
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A number of states, such as France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Germany, Portugal, Austria, Italy, Poland, Romania,
United Kingdom and Ireland have all been accused of facilitating
extraordinary rendition by allowing transit of such flights.89 In
most countries investigations have been launched only to result in
statements that no evidence has been found to support the claim of
such cooperation.9"
These sites have been claimed to exist in Afghanistan at the
Bagram Air Base9' and in Iraq92 at Camp Cropper.93 It has also
been claimed that the Abu Ghraib prison worked as a black site,
but there is less evidence of this assertion.94 In addition Jordan 95
and Pakistan have been claimed to be black site hosts.96 Black
sites are also alleged to exist in Egypt,9 and Morocco, for example
at the al-Tamara interrogation centre near Rabat.98 In Thailand,
the Voice of America relay station in Udon Thani has been said to
host a black site.99 Claims have also been made that black sites
have existed in several European countries, especially in the post-
communist states, such as Poland,' at Mihail Kogdlniceanu near
Constanta, in Romania, 1°1  Armenia, 10 2  Georgia,' °3  Latvia,
89 See European Parliament Report, supra note 30.
90 See Intelligence and Security Committee, supra note 85.
91 European Parliament Report, supra note 25, at para. 160.
92 Josh White, Army, CIA Agreed on 'Ghost' Prisoners, WASH. POST, Mar. 11,
2005, at A16.
93 Jamie McIntyre, Pentagon: Iraqi Held Secretly at CIA Request, CNN, Jun. 16,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/16/ghost.prisoner/index.html.
94 White, supra note 92.
95 European Parliament Report, supra note 30, at para. 105.
96 Amnesty Report, supra note 84, at 8
97 European Parliament Report, supra note 25, at para. 107.
98 European Parliament Report, supra note 25, at para. 89; Jason Burke, Secret
World of U.S. Jails, THE OBSERVER (U.K.), Jun. 13, 1994,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/j un/13/usa.terrorism.
99 EuR. PARL. Ass. Report, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees
Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, Doc. 11302 (June 11,
2007) at n. 27; see also Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al.
100 Amnesty Report, supra note 84, at 15; European Parliament Report, supra note
25, at 174 (mentioning Szymany Airport as involved in rendition flights).
101 See The Associated Press, Romanian President Says CIA Flights May Have
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Bulgaria 1°4 and Slovakia."°5 Not only ex-communist states have
been implicated, but many Western states have been accused of
tolerating activities by the CIA including, Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.'06
As for documentary proof of such sites, it is sadly lacking. It
is obviously in the nature of things that first hand sources will not
be readily available. However, one would have expected some
form of effort on behalf of organizations of human rights to seek
some form of primary sources, at least as far as pronouncements,
and denials, of by United States government are concerned. Even
parliamentary reports like those of the EU Parliamentary
Assembly °7 and of the Parliament of the Council of Europe 1°8
(two bodies often confused), as well as the UN High Commission
for Human Rights,0 9 generally refer only to newspaper articles,
and refrain from citing any first hand documentary sources. This
practice of resorting to secondary and even tertiary sources is even
used for references to statements of the United States government,
such as denials or for the Executive Orders prohibiting torture for
which official documents are readily available." 0
Landed in Country, Feb. 8, 2006, available at,
http://www.tkb.org/NewsStory.jsp?storylD=105414; see also European Parliament
Report, supra note 25, at 149.
102 Amnesty Report, supra note 84, at 16.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 European Parliament Report, supra note 25.
107 See e.g., European Parliament Report, supra note 25.
108 See, e.g., EUR. PARL. Ass., Report from the Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human
Rights: Lawfulness of Detentions by the United States in Guantdnamo Bay, Doc. No.
10497, § I1 (2005), http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asplink=http://assembly.coe.int/
Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10497.htm (citing The Washington Post, The
New York Times, The Guardian, The Observer, and Vanity Fair).
109 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Comm.
against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, at 5 (July 25, 2006).
110 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13, 440, 3 Fed. Reg. 40, 707 (July 20, 2007). This
document is rarely cited and often replaced by a secondary newspaper reference.
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VIII.Legality or Illegality of Extraordinary Rendition
Some international bodies have criticized the system of
extraordinary rendition. On May 19, 2006, the United Nations
Committee Against Torture, the U.N. body that monitors
compliance with the United Nations Convention Against Torture,
recommended that the United States cease holding detainees in
alleged secret detention facilities and stop the practice of rendering
prisoners to countries where they are likely to be tortured. 1
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on
January 23, 2008 backed a report saying the use of arbitrary
terrorist black-lists by the UN and the EU violate fundamental
rights.' 12
Such attitudes, however, may fail to take into consideration
that a state's most important duty is to its own citizens and in the
present volatile world a state is certainly expected to do its utmost
to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks.
It is possible that this duty cannot be discharged unless certain
suspected terrorists are allowed to be subjected to fierce and
effective interrogation. If there is no mistaken identity and the
arrested person actually is a genuine risk to the citizens in a state,
officials must be entitled to question him using some form of
pressure, where the limits of such pressure are a matter of common
sense. It cannot not be right - or even efficient - to subject a
person to torture. Nor can it be right to be so lenient that the
arrested person feels no pressure to part with vital information, for
example with regard to a planned terrorist attack.
IX. Compatibility of Extraordinary Rendition with
International Law
There are three main questions that should be raised when
assessing the legality or illegality of extraordinary rendition.
One question is whether suspected terrorists that have been
subjected to extraordinary rendition are "protected persons" under
111 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee
Against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture,
3 6th Session, CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 1-19, 2006).
112 See EUR. PARL. Ass., United Nations and European Union blacklists: Resolution
1597, 5th Sitting (Jan. 23, 2008), http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta08/ERES 1597.htm.
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the Geneva Conventions, specifically whether they form part of
the group of persons who, cannot be forcibly moved under Article
49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War ("Geneva Convention IV")." 3
A second question concerns whether the Torture Convention
or any other rules in international law prohibits torture to
interrogate suspected terrorists, and whether or not they qualify as
protected persons. An additional question under this heading
concerns whether torture is only prohibited in the territory of states
bound by the Torture Convention or are signatories bound outside
of their territory.
A third question relates to the view that there are binding rules
on minimum standards of behavior with regard to the treatment of
individuals, rules which form part of international peremptory
norms orjus cogens.
It is important to keep these three questions distinguished.
A. The Protected Persons Argument
The first question must probably be answered in the negative
as the Geneva Convention IV is designed to protect "real"
civilians,'14 and those who take up arms and engage in hostilities,
which at least some suspected terrorists certainly do, fall outside
all protection under the Convention." 5  However, this does not
necessarily mean that there are not other rules under international
law which protect persons from torture or other harsh forms of
interrogation, as will be explored later in this text.
In 2004 United States Assistant Attorney General Jack
Goldsmith stated that "protected persons" apprehended in Iraq
could be subjected to so called extraordinary rendition and sent to
113 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 63, art. 49.
114 Id. art. 3. "Civilians" are "persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria ... " and under Article 4 are
"persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." Id. arts. 3-4.
115 See Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra note 45, at 1060.
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be "interrogated" in another state."'
"Protected persons" are those who form part of the civilian
population in an occupied area. Under the Geneva Convention IV
on Civilians such people must not be moved. Article 49 of IV
Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning Civilians states that:
"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not,
are prohibited, regardless of their motive" '117
However the captured persons to whom the Assistant Attorney
General referred are not any such civilians: they are unlawful or
illegal combatants and do not enjoy any protection under the Law
of War. It was indeed unfortunate that the Attorney General
referred to "protected persons." There is no question that if real
"protected persons" had been at issue it would certainly be illegal
under international law to remove such civilians from the territory
in question.118 However, the whole point is that at least some of
the persons removed were not such civilians and thus not
"protected persons." If a person takes up arms and engages in
hostilities, as some of the transferred person are alleged to have
done, they have lost their status of "civilians" and are no longer
"protected persons." '119  It was also unfortunate that the
Memorandum specifically refers to Article 49, claiming that
transfers would be compatible with this provision in the case of
"illegal aliens." The Memo states that:
"The United States may, consistent with Article 49:
(1) remove "protected persons" who are illegal aliens from Iraq
116 Draft Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney General,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, regarding the Permissibility of
Relocating "Protected Persons" from Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004), in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 366-80 (K.J. Greenberg & J.L. Dratel eds., 2005)
[hereinafter March Draft Memo].
117 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 63, art. 49.
118 Id.
119 See Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra note 45, at 1060; see also INGRID DETTER,
THE LAW OF WAR 136-37, 148 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that because civilians who take
up arms and engage in hostilities are not protected as soldiers, they are not regarded as
POWs under Geneva Convention II and, unless they wear uniforms and fulfill other
criteria of a soldier, they are "illegal" or "unlawful" combatants).
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pursuant to local immigration law; and
(2) relocated "protected persons" (whether illegal aliens or not)
from Iraq to another country to facilitate interrogation, for a
brief but not indefinite period, as long as adjudicative
proceedings have not been initiated against them"'
20
Geneva Convention IV provides that violations, inter alia, of
Article 49 concerning forced transfers constitutes a "grave breach"
of the accord, and thus a "war crime" under U.S. federal law,
according to a footnote in the Justice Department draft. 2 ' "For
these reasons," the footnote reads, "we recommend that any
contemplated relocations of "protected persons" from Iraq to
facilitate interrogation be carefully evaluated for compliance with
Article 49 on a case by case basis."'122 It says that even persons
removed from Iraq retain the treaty's protections, which includes
the right to humane treatment and to contact with international
monitors. 1
23
It is of considerable importance, however, that the often cited
Memorandum of March 19, 2004 is marked as a "Draft." It is not
compatible with correct legal assessment to treat this document as
if it were an official and final document authorizing extraordinary
rendition.
According to unconfirmed claims that surrounds the process of
extraordinary rendition, the CIA is said to have "used" the March
draft memo as legal support for secretly transporting detainees out
of Iraq to be interrogated elsewhere for a "brief but not indefinite
period" and has permanently removed persons deemed to be
"illegal aliens" under "local immigration law." Another OLC draft
memorandum from August 1, 2002 is said to exist that again
authorizes the removal of suspected terrorists from Iraq and from
other locations. 1
24
A point may be made initially about the importance of
120 March Draft Memo, supra note 116, at 367-68.
121 Id. at 379.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 379-80.
124 See, e.g., Memorandum Jay S. Baybee, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, regarding Standards of Conduct for
Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS:
THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172-217 (K.J. Greenberg & J.L. Dratel eds., 2005).
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establishing the true identity of a suspected terrorist. There have
been some scandals involving cases when innocent persons have
been held and treated as possible terrorists. In some cases persons
have certainly been subjected to erroneous rendition, usually as a
result of mistaken identity. In December 2005 the CIA's Inspector
General admitted that the CIA was investigating what the Agency
called "erroneous renditions."'125 Khalid El-Masri is one such
case. 126  Another incident concerned the radical Islamist cleric
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, who was
kidnapped in Milan on February 17, 2003, and sent to Egypt,
where he was held until February 11, 2007, when an Egyptian
court ruled his imprisonment was "unfounded."'' 27
It is important to retain the qualification of "combatants" to
ensure that the Law of War protects those that most deserve to be
protected, that is to say real soldiers and real civilians. To enjoy
full protection under the Law of War a combatant must wear a
distinctive sign or uniform showing that he is a soldier, be under
military command, carry arms openly and follow himself the rules
of the Law of War. 128
B. The Torture Argument
The second question concerns precisely what limits
international law poses to prevent suspected terrorists form being
tortured or subjected to other forms of harsh treatment.
In this context it must first be analyzed what actually
constitutes "torture." It is clear that to some extent some forms of
treatment may be experienced differently by different people.
125 Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 2005, at Al.
126 Id.
127 The Associated Press, Abducted Egyptian Cleric Released, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
2007.
128 See Detter, The Law of War, supra note 119, at 136-148; Detter, Illegal
Combatants, supra note 45, at 1058-59. For a questionable decision regarding the
requirement that lawful combatants wear distinctive insignia, see Military Prosecutor v.
Omar Mahmud Kassem and Others, 42 I.L.R. 470 (Israeli Military Ct. at Ramallah,
1969) (holding that "dark green dress and mottled peaked caps" do fulfill the
requirement because "civilians resident in the area where the encounter with the Israeli
forces took place do not usually wear green clothes or mottled caps."); see also Dinstein,
Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict 48 (2004).
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Some, with a low threshold of pain, may consider even light
pressure as unbearable and would consider this as torture. Other
more courageous persons may find, when subjected to fierce
interrogation, that they do not place this on the level of torture.
The inevitable subjective element, that is to say how different
persons experience specific interrogation methods, is also
reminiscent of the discrepancy between the English and French
versions of the Geneva Conventions. The English version speaks
of "unnecessary suffering" which certainly involves a subjective
evaluation.'29 The French version, on the other hand, speaks of
maux superflus, ("excessive wounds"), which, of course, has a far
more objective meaning.1 30
Nevertheless there is normally a vague agreement that any
considerable physical harm inflicted on a person does constitute
torture. What is more difficult to ascertain is whether
psychological pressure, which can be far more effective in terms
of interrogation, amounts to torture. There is also an ancillary
question as to whether threats to harm other members of a
person's family amounts to torture; such threats can cause
immense suffering to a person held for questioning.
It is also relevant that the United States has made some
significant reservations to the Torture Convention. The term
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" will be interpreted
according to United States rules.' This evokes the famous
reservation that the United States appended to its accession to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, stating that the United
States itself would decide what question concerns national security
for which the ICJ is not competent.
132
129 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 47, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (English language); see also Detter, The Law of War, supra note
119, at 165.
130 Geneva Conventions supra, note 129 (French language).
131 Namely, "cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment" or punishment is interpreted
through the law of the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States. See 136 Cong. Rec. 17,486 (1990) (resolution of ratification of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment).
132 See Reservation to the Optional Clause of the ICJ by the United States, 61 Stat.
1218, 1946 WL 25470 (US Treaty).
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The Torture Convention is slightly unhelpful with regard to the
definition of torture. Article 1 provides that:
"For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions." '
It is vital to note the very last sentence, which removes all
sense to the prohibition as any state involved in extraordinary
rendition programs would argue that the interrogation methods
are, indeed, part of lawful sanctions in the case of suspected
terrorists. Furthermore, the condition that pain and suffering must
have been inflicted by an "official," or by someone with "official"
sanction, also removes certain scenarios from the ambit of the
Convention.
In any event, the states to which extraordinary rendition flights
are said to have been sent are virtually all non-signatories of the
Torture Convention.
The question as to what sort of pressure can be allowed in
order to extract information from suspected terrorists must also be
addressed. Some forms of interrogations have clearly produced
important results. It is clear that some interrogations have yielded
valuable results in the sense that projected terrorist attacks have
been foiled. According to White House, interrogation by CIA has
often preempted serious terrorist attempts. 3 4  For example, the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi Binalshibh helped to
break up a cell of Southeast Asian terrorist operatives preparing
133 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112.
134 President George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror at
Wardman Park Marriott Hotel, Wash., D.C. (Sept. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060929-3.html.
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attacks in the United States, foil an al Qaeda operation to develop
anthrax, expose planned strikes on a U.S. Marine camp in
Djibouti, as well as on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, and finally
thwart plots to hijack passenger planes and to fly them into
installations and buildings at Heathrow Airport and in London's
Canary Wharf. 135
Further, on December 26, 2005, it was reported that the
capture of al Qaeda leaders Ramzi Binalshibh in Pakistan, Omar
al-Faruq in Indonesia, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Kuwait and
Muhammad al Darbi in Yemen were all partly the result of
information gained during interrogations.136
The core of the question is actually a matter of the territorial
reach of prohibitions of torture. Some assume that states which
have not adhered to the Torture Convention (or other binding
treaty on the matter) are free to practice torture. Others appear to
think, as some in the US Administration do, that, although a
ratifying state is not free to practice torture in its own territory, it is
free to do so elsewhere or that it is free to delegate the process of
applying such pressure in interrogations.'37 Hence the expression
"torture by proxy."'
38
But this is a fallacy. To apply some historical perspective to
the question, the German government during World War II had
not signed any treaties or conventions on genocide; the Genocide
Convention had not even come into existence. Nor had wartime
Germany adhered to any binding agreements forbidding torture (or
135 Dan Eggan and Dafna Lizner, Secret World of Detainees Grows More Public,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A18.
136 Id.
137 See Craig Forcese, A New Geography of Abuse? The Contested Scope of U.S.
Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment Obligations, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 908,
908-09 (2006) (illuminating Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez's account of the United
States' position regarding the applicability of the Torture Convention to treatment of
aliens beyond the nation's borders).
138 On the prohibition of torture in areas outside the territory of the State see R. (on
the application of Al-Skeini) v. Sec'y of State for Def., 2004 WL 2810920 (Q.B.D.
Admin. Ct. Dec. 14 2004) (holding that the fundamental scope of jurisdiction under
Article 1 is territorial). But see, Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 513, 515 (1995) (preliminary objections) ("the responsibility of Contracting
Parties can be involved because of acts of their authorities, whether performed within or
outside national boundaries, which produce effects outside their own territory")
(emphasis added).
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other gruesome practices) outside its own territory, for example in
Auschwitz in Poland. Yet the War Crime Tribunal in Nuremberg
came to the conclusion that Germany had severely violated
international law for which even individual responsibility could be
incurred.139
The question concerning the territorial reach of the prohibition
of torture is linked to the next problem discussed here, that
concerning minimum standards in international law.
C. The Minimum Standards Argument
There is room for suggesting that even though certain
countries have not ratified the Torture Convention, and even
though the harsh interrogations takes place outside the territory of
the United States, all states have an obligation under international
law to behave in a civilized way and refrain from torture or other
inhumane treatment of individuals.1 40
One question concerns whether the application of the Law of
War has territorial limitations. The theatre of the War on Terror
may be global, and the rules which are part of the Law of War, for
example those concerning the prohibition of torture, may appear
to apply. Some then insist that it is by virtue of the rules of the
Law of War that the torture of suspected terrorists is prohibited,
while others would contend that this is so on the basis of the
Torture Convention. 141  On closer analysis, neither of these
assumptions may be correct: there might be a prohibitive rule
because of another basis of obligation, for example a prohibition
under peremptory rules of international law.
These are the other rules of international, outside formal
treaties, which cannot be ignored when assessing the legality or
illegality of torture.
The International Court of Justice has repeatedly insisted that
all states are bound to respect fundamental human rights. 42 Some
139 See, e.g. Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
830, 839-40 (2006).
140 See Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra note 45, at 1089.
141 See International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law
and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts 9 (2003), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/5XRDCC/$File/IHLcontemp_armedc
onflictsFINALANG.pdf.
142 See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
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twenty-eight years ago the Court confirmed this view in the
Hostage Case and stated:
"Wrongfully deprive human beings of their freedom and
subject them to physical hardship is in itself manifestly
incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 1
43
Here the Court did not even mention torture but only
"hardship" which clearly sets a lower level for what is acceptable
as treatment of others. The Court, however, inserts the proviso of
"wrongfully" which just might exclude certain forms of
interrogation of suspected terrorists.
Courts in many countries have also claimed that torture is
forbidden under general international law. 144 In other words, states
may be held responsible for acts they have procured or allowed in
areas under their control or occupation, or, indeed, for acts
committed in territories to which they have deliberately dispatched
a person for interrogation. 145  States, companies and individuals
that connive in such transport where torture might be the
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21); see also Detter,
International Legal Order, supra note 43, at 290.
143 (1980) ICJ Reports 1980, 42.
144 See Detter, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 43, at 290. General
international law is clearly a wider concept than "customary international law," even
though many in the United States use the terms interchangeably. But general
international law obviously also includes treaties and agreement, as well as rules on
ethics and on jus cogens. None of which are necessarily tied to "customary" law; see
also Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra 45, at 1054 (noting the absurdity of a "negative
custom").
145 See Issa v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, 71-74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2004),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/view.asp?item=1 &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlig
ht=-issa%20%7C%20turkey&sessionid=6048954&skin=hudoc-en; Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) I.C.J. 136,
179 (July 9); L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, No. 52/1979, Views of the H.R.C., 12.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981); Casariego v. Uruguay, No. 56/1979,
Views of the H.R.C., 10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (July 29, 1981); Coard et
al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEAISer.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. 37 (1999), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/UnitedStates10.951.htm; Alejandre et al.
v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6
rev. 23 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/
Cubal 1.589.htm.
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foreseeable result may also have their responsibility engaged as
they, too, have the duty to prevent torture. 146
It is essential to establish that the minimum standards evoked
in this context are not necessarily those found in treaties and
international conventions. It may be that the rules laid down in
Articles 27-78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
provisions of Article 75 of the Second Protocol of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions correspond, roughly, to the minimum
standards. But it is most important to underline that terrorists are
not protected by the Law of War as they do not wear uniforms and
do not qualify as soldiers, nor as Civilians. 147
When the Red Cross attempted to suggest that "no one must be
left unprotected" by the Law of War, that organization did not
service to the soldier in the field, nor to the real civilian: both
would suffer by this dissipation of the rules of protection under the
Law of War.148 If we dilute the contents of protection to protect
those who do not deserve to be protected we will alter the whole
essence of the Law of War and make such rules worthless, and the
soldier and the civilian will be exposed to much danger.
This is not to say that states may treat suspected terrorists as
they please. Although, it must be insisted, the suspected terrorist
does not have the right to be protected as a prisoner of war nor as a
civilian, there are some minimum standards that apply. It is clear
he must not be subjected to torture. But one comes back to the
question of definition: water-boarding and outright physical harm
is certainly prohibited under general international law (not under
146 See Z and Others v. U.K. No. 29392/95, 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. 384 (2001), available
at http:// www.echr.coe.int/eng, see also A v. U.K. No. 100/1997/884/1096, 5 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 137 at para. 22 (1998), available at http:/ www.echr.coe.int/eng, see also Ilascu
and Others v. Mold. and Russ. 9, (2004) Eur. Ct. H.R. 48787/ at para. 318, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
147 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (explaining the criteria that establish
whether a combatant will be protected by the Geneva Conventions, including the
requirement that a soldier wear a uniform or other distinctive dress). The point about
uniforms is clearly the question of distinction that you show to your enemy that you are a
member of the armed forces. Although the Law of War allows ruses and surreptitious
practices, it does not allow soldiers to be disguised as civilians; see also Detter, The Law
of War, supra note 119, at 135.
148 See ICRC 2003 Report, supra note 141; see also Detter, Illegal Combatants,
supra note 45, at 1058-59.
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customary law, as some pretend as "negative custom" is an absurd
notion).'49 But some pressure must be allowed, such as sleep
deprivation, in cases such as when a suspected terrorist has
information as to where there is a bomb which might kill a great
number of people. It is not that the suffering of one is worth that
of thousands, but a matter of common sense, that interrogation
must be allowed to use some form of minor force.'
X. Conclusions.
No state can escape responsibility for inflicting harm on
individuals during interrogations. It should also be underlined that
the state cannot claim that its security services have exceeded their
power as the state has a duty to supervise and closely monitor such
activities.' 5'
On the other hand, it is clear that some pressure is allowed to
extract information from suspected terrorists but there is also a
certain level beyond which questioning should not proceed.
The whole system of extraordinary rendition has
overemphasized the territoriality aspect. If captives cannot be
subjected to techniques of interrogation legally in the United
States, some find it acceptable that they are sent abroad to states
where such methods are not illegal. But all this ignores the fact
that the procedure might be illegal under international law and it
may be futile to use domestic law arguments to evade obligations
under the international legal system.' In Filartiga v Pena-Irala a
United States court held that the torturer has become "like the
pirate and the slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind."'' 5 3 Recently it has been possible to claim
that it is the terrorist who has become such an outlaw and enemy
of mankind.'54 But by resorting to torturer the torturer thus places
149 See Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra note 45, at 1054.
150 See The Ireland Case, supra note 59; see also the text accompanying Refugee
Convention, supra note 36.
151 See Klass and Others v. F.R.G No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 at para. 71 and
75 (1980), available at http:/ www.echr.coe.int/eng. See also Leander v. Swed., No.
9248/81,9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 at para. 84 (1987), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/eng.
152 See Detter, International Legal Order, supra note 43, at 168-170.
153 D. Filartiga and J. Filartiga, v. Pean-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
154 See Detter, Illegal Combatants, supra note 45, at 1096.
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himself on the same unacceptable level as the terrorist.
A state may not use its own legislation to escape obligations
under international law.'55 The Alabama Arbitration illustrates that
a state is under a duty to make sure that its internal laws comply
with international law and, if they do not, the state may incur
responsibility for consequences of the discrepancy between
international law and municipal law.156 The Permanent Court of
International Justice also held in Polish Nationals in Danzig'57 that a
state cannot invoke its own constitution or other internal rules to
escape obligations under international law. In the same way, then,
the United States cannot justify moving detainees to other locations
only on the ground that the interrogations techniques to be used are
illegal under US law. Such methods are also illegal under
international law and the state's responsibility is engaged when
seeking to evade obligations under internal law which, ironically,
also apply world wide under the minimum standard rules of the
international legal system.
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has also spoken
to a state's responsibility for of extraterritorial acts in Legal
consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.'58
Just as much as those responsible for Germany's practices
during the Second World War could not escape responsibility for
war crimes by claiming that acts committed were legal (and even
commended) by the internal legal system, so a state cannot now
claim that because something is illegal in its own state, it would be
legal to arrange to have such acts carried out elsewhere.
155 Id.
156 For a discussion of the Alabama Claims and their outcome resulting in the
Treaty of Washington see CALEB CUSHING, THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON: ITS
NEGOTIATION, EXECUTION, AND THE DISCUSSIONS RELATING THERETO (Harper & Bros.
1873). For the Case presented by the U.S. stating their claims in the Alabama Claims
see The Case of the United States, to be Laid Before the Tribunal of Arbitration: to be
Convened at Geneva under the Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of
America and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, concluded at Washington, May 8,
1871 (Richard Bently & Sons, 1872).
157 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in
the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser A/B) no. 44 (Feb. 4).
158 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I. C. J. 136 (July 9).
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The argument that a state is not liable for what it allows or
organizes in the territory of other states, indeed, in territories
outside its sovereignty like Guantanamo Bay, is a fallacy. The
arguments is based on the faulty premise that territoriality is all
and that actions beyond a state's territory can somehow be
distanced from government action. This is not correct and there is
still a question of liability for such action which in due course
might mature.
The United States would probably gain far more sympathy
even for fierce or enhanced interrogation practices of suspected
terrorists if such questioning took place in the United States. But
what is not acceptable in international law is to seek to escape
liability by organizing interrogations clandestinely, involving
torture flights (at what cost?) and black sites.
It is also beyond doubt that information obtained through
torture is notoriously unreliable and it is therefore perhaps not
wise to engage the state's responsibility (and probably damage its
good name) by arranging torture flight abroad.
The European Court of Human Rights has also confirmed that
the prohibition of torture extends to areas under effective control
of the state.159 The same attitude has been taken by English
courts.16° Occupied territories over which a state has established
authority thus come within the ambit of the human rights
obligations of the state.161
Delegation of interrogation procedures to another state can
thus not rid a state of its responsibility for torture if it arranges
flights to areas outside its own territory. On the other hand, at the
root of the problem, it is not quite established what sort of
practices and in how many cases interrogations practices have
exceeded what is permissible under international law. Newspaper
reports and evidence given by released detainees, possibly
159 See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 513, 515
(1995) (preliminary objections) ("The responsibility of a Contracting State can also arise
when as a consequence of military action-whether lawful or unlawful-it exercises
effective control of an area outside its national territory.")
160 See R. (on the application of Al-Skeini) v. Sec'y of State for Def., 2004 WL
2810920 (Q.B.D. Admin. Ct. Dec. 14, 2004).
161 See, e.g., EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons
Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga, eds. 2004) for a comprehensive publication devoted
to this subject.
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delivered during a post-traumatic state of mind, must be largely
discarded and only clear evidence as to excessive interrogation
methods must be accepted. 162 The truth about such practices is not
easy to establish. Nor is the truth of what is revealed under torture
easy to ascertain.
On the other hand, it is clear that the prohibition of torture is
one of the basic tenets of jus cogens, the peremptory rules from
which no derogation is permitted. 163 Along with genocide, slavery
and genocide, it must be noted that torture is also forbidden by
these fundamental and intrinsic rules of international law. 164
In a landmark case in the House of Lords in England it was
decided that evidence obtained through torture is not allowed in
English courts. 165 The main reason for this attitude is clearly that
such evidence is not sufficiently reliable to form the basis for
ensuing convictions. The same attitude should prevail in the
international field and it should be accepted that torture is rarely
the appropriate method to arrive at the truth.
162 See, e.g., Richard Bonner, Detainee Says he was Tortured while in US Custody,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at Al.
163 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
164 See, e.g., The Tokyo and Nuremberg Trials, supra note 81; see also Prosecutor v
Furundzija, 38 ILM 317, 349 (1999).
165 A(FC) and Others v Secretary of the Home Department, 2005 U.K.H.L. 71
(2005). The unanimous judgment confirmed that, under English law, "torture and its
fruits" could not be used in evidence in court. See id. at para 51. But the information
obtained could be used by the police as "it would be ludicrous for them to disregard
information [about a ticking bomb] if it had been procured by torture." Id. at para 68.
The Law Lords thus dismissed, to some extent, concerns about the accuracy of
information obtained under torture.
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